What the Shutts Opt-Out Right is and What it Ought to Be by Wolfman, Brian & Morrison, Alan B.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2006 
What the Shutts Opt-Out Right is and What it Ought to Be 
Brian Wolfman 
Georgetown University Law Center, wolfmanb@law.georgetown.edu 
Alan B. Morrison 
George Washington University Law School, abmorrison@law.gwu.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-062 
 
 




74 U. Kan. L. Rev. 729-764 (2006) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=975231
WHAT THE SHUTTS OPT-OUT RIGHT IS AND WHAT 
IT OUGHT TO BE 
Brian Wolfman* 
Alan B. Morrison** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,1 the Supreme Court addressed the 
question whether a Kansas state court had the power to certify a nationwide class 
of plaintiffs.  The great majority of the class were citizens of other states who had 
no contact with Kansas relevant to the class members’ claims for interest on 
natural gas royalties whose payment had been delayed by the defendant.2  
Drawing on the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the due process limits on a 
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, Phillips Petroleum 
argued that such a class could not be certified because the Kansas court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the unnamed absent plaintiffs who did not have 
“minimum contacts” with Kansas and who had not affirmatively consented to the 
Kansas court’s jurisdiction.3 
In arguing that nationwide certification was constitutionally impermissible, 
Phillips claimed concern over the possibility that the trial court might certify the 
nationwide class, and thereafter enter judgment on the merits, but that the 
judgment would lack binding effect on absent plaintiffs.4  Phillips thus feared 
that the absentees would later claim that, because they had not been subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court that had issued the judgment, they were free to sue 
Phillips in a subsequent suit.5  Although the Court understood that the judgment 
had to have binding effect, it rejected Phillips’ analogy between the “minimum 
contacts” necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant and 
the requisites for a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an absent class member.6  
In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the suggestion, built on personal 
jurisdiction doctrine, that, for absentees to be bound, they must affirmatively 
consent by opting in to the class, much as a defendant might affirmatively 
consent to jurisdiction by choosing to defend an action even when it lacks 
minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.7 
Instead, the Court held that, for a class action to bind an absent class 
member, 
[t]he plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and 
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel.  The notice 
must be the best practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all the 
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1 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
2 See id. at 799-800. 
3 Id. at 802. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 805. 
6 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808. 
7 Id. at 812. 
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circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  . . .  The notice 
should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it.  Additionally, we 
hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be 
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing 
and returning an “opt out” or “request for exclusion” form to the court.  
Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at 
all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.8 
Thus, notice to the class and the opportunity to exclude oneself from the 
class—which the Court viewed as a type of implied consent—was all the consent 
necessary to bind the class. 
Shutts upheld the national certification because the trial court’s procedures 
had met the due process requisites: the plaintiff class was provided a detailed 
notice, that notice had given absentees an opportunity to object, the class 
members had been provided an opportunity to opt out (which many had 
exercised), and the Kansas courts’ determination that the named plaintiffs had 
provided adequate representation had not been challenged.9 
The Court limited its holding to “an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for 
money damages or similar relief at law,”10 specifying that it was addressing only 
“those class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims 
wholly or predominately for money judgments[,] . . . [and] intimat[ing] no view 
concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief.”11  
As we shall see, this limitation has proved problematic for courts assessing the 
breadth of Shutts’ opt-out right.12 
II.  THE SCOPE OF SHUTTS’ OPT-OUT RIGHT 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction or More? 
To appreciate current disputes over the breadth of Shutts’ opt-out right, it is 
necessary to understand how the class action terrain has changed since Shutts was 
decided in 1985.  In Shutts itself, the defendant, while trumpeting the rights of 
the absentees to avoid the binding effect of a class judgment, was seeking to 
overturn a class certification ruling and set aside a large judgment in favor of the 
                                                                                                                         
 
8 Id. (citations omitted). 
9 Id. at 813-14. 
10 Id. at 811. 
11 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 & n.24 (1999) 
(reaffirming opt-out requirement and noting “important caveat” that Shutts’ holding applied only to 
claims “wholly or predominantly for money judgments”). 
12 In a second ruling, the Court held that due process did not allow application of Kansas law to all 
plaintiffs.  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 814-23.  We do not address this choice-of-law issue further, except to 
note that the Court rejected the argument that due process had been met because, by not opting out, 
the absentees had consented to be bound by Kansas substantive law.  Id. at 820. 




class.  If Phillips had been successful in defeating nationwide certification, any 
subsequent single-state class action or a nationwide opt-in action might never 
have materialized.  And even if such alternative class actions were filed, they 
would be far less powerful than a nationwide opt-out class like the one certified 
in Kansas.  Of considerable significance is that Shutts was a litigation class 
action: one in which no settlement has been reached, and the plaintiff class seeks 
certification intending to take the case to trial and judgment.  In such an action, 
the defendant opposes certification with the hope of derailing the case entirely or 
limiting its scope. 
But this is not the context in which most Shutts opt-out disputes have arisen 
in recent years.  Increasingly, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the major battles over 
opt-out rights have concerned settlement class actions, in which defendants 
agreed with the named plaintiffs’ lawyers to class certification, but only for the 
purpose of carrying out a settlement on the merits.13  In these cases, of course, the 
defendant is agreeing to, rather than resisting, class certification.  And in many of 
these cases, the defendant would prefer that the class action be “mandatory,” or 
non-opt-out, to maximize the settlement’s res judicata effect.14  Defendants’ 
efforts to obtain mandatory class certification and settlement have occurred 
mainly, but not exclusively, in the mass tort context, rather than in small claims 
consumer, antitrust, or securities cases, in which defendants have little to fear 
from providing an opt-out right because class members in such cases rarely opt 
out.  Indeed, because these small claims usually do not support individual 
litigation, defendants generally resist class certification in such cases because 
defeating certification effectively defeats the claims. 
On the other hand, in the cases in which opt-out matters, ranging from high-
value personal injury cases15 to middle-value cases alleging financial 
misconduct16 to certain employment disputes,17 defendants want to cut off opt-
out rights through a mandatory settlement, which, if approved by the court, fixes 
the price of an all-purpose “cram down” at the figure agreed to by plaintiffs’ 
counsel.18  This kind of class settlement is often attractive to a defendant facing a 
                                                                                                                         
 
13 See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (overturning settlement 
class action and setting certification requirements for settlement classes); FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL 
ON COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.132, 250 (2004) (discussing settlement classes). 
14 See, e.g., Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
defendant’s interest in maximizing res judicata effect through use of mandatory classes). 
15 See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815; In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000); 
In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
16 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Tower Loan of 
Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Miss. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. Crystian, 91 F. App’x 952 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
17 See, e.g., White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994). 
18 The term “cram down” comes from the Bankruptcy Code, under which a court, in specified 
circumstances, has the express power to force a plan of reorganization over the objections of some 
of the creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006).  That is the effect of allowing non-opt-out class 
certification under Rule 23. 




significant number of pending or future suits.19  Indeed, the global peace that 
comes from mandatory certification is so enticing to defendants facing myriad 
individual suits that they have, on occasion, sought out plaintiffs’ counsel with 
whom to agree on a mandatory class settlement even where no class action was 
previously pending.20 
Thus, the present-day battle over opt-out rights involves settling defendants 
and plaintiffs’ counsel seeking mandatory certification on the one hand, and 
putative opt-out absentee-objectors challenging the settling parties’ cram down 
efforts on the other.  Understanding this dynamic is important because it sheds 
light on the inadequacy of Shutts’ reasoning in explaining why opt-out rights 
ought to be protected.  Shutts involved a class certification challenge by a 
defendant, allegedly championing the absentees’ rights, but for its own interests, 
not those of the class members.21  Thus, Phillips was thinking like a defendant: it 
sought to apply to absent class members the due process doctrines that were 
developed to enable defendants to avoid the expense and inconvenience of being 
haled into court to defend lawsuits in distant, unfamiliar places.  That analysis 
makes sense for defendants who may, in fact, not wish to be dragged into a 
distant (and inhospitable) forum.  But “distant forum abuse”22 is irrelevant for 
absent plaintiffs considering whether to opt out.  Generally, an absent plaintiff 
who is notified of a class action and given the opportunity to opt out is deciding 
between two courses of action.  First, the absentee may want to opt out so that 
she can continue prosecuting a pending lawsuit or file a new suit in the forum of 
her choice.  The location of the class action forum or the geographical confines 
of the jurisdiction where the class action was filed will almost certainly not be a 
factor in making that decision.  Second, the absentee may decide to stay in the 
class action and leave it to the class lawyer to litigate the suit wherever it was 
filed.  Generally, a stay-in decision, because it is premised on a judgment that 
someone else will be competent to represent the absentee’s interests, would also 
not be affected by the location of the class action forum.  Since claims for 
monetary relief (whether through settlement or a litigated judgment) will almost 
certainly be submitted by mail or perhaps online (if any submission is required), 
proximity to the courthouse will be equally irrelevant.23 
                                                                                                                         
 
19 We acknowledge that such mandatory suits can benefit class members who might not otherwise 
have brought suit and would have obtained nothing.  On the other hand, when a court strikes down 
a mandatory settlement, the parties may still negotiate an opt-out settlement that provides class 
members with substantial relief.  See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985 
(S.D. Ohio 2001). 
20 See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 825-27 (class complaint and settlement filed simultaneously). 
21 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
22 Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions 
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 52-54 (1986). 
23 On occasion, a class member will object to a class settlement or intervene or otherwise 
participate in the case.  When that occurs, the distance of the forum may be an impediment and thus 
an appropriate factor for a court to consider in facilitating the participation of absentees (such as 
holding hearings in locations other than the forum, allowing video and telephone participation, and 
the like).  However, in that circumstance, the distant forum does not implicate the opt-out right.  It 




We believe that a view of Shutts that goes beyond personal jurisdiction can 
be derived from the decision itself.  To be sure, the initial discussion in Shutts of 
the due process rights of absent class members is, as we have noted, cast in 
personal jurisdiction terms.24  Thus, the Court stated that “a forum State may 
exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even 
though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum 
which would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”25  Thereafter, 
however, the Court set forth the minimum due process protections that must be 
afforded to “absent plaintiff[s] concerning a claim for money damages or similar 
relief at law”26 without geographical limitation.  In our view, then, the teaching 
of Shutts, if not its actual holding, is that, although minimum contacts are not 
necessary to bind absent class members, minimal due process—notice, adequate 
representation, and an opportunity to opt out—must be accorded all class 
members who were not named as plaintiffs, not just those lacking jurisdictional 
contacts, before those class members can be bound.  The property interests of 
those class members arise not from the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, but 
from two other related strains of the Court’s due process jurisprudence.  The first 
is exemplified by cases such as Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.27 and Shutts 
itself,28 which make clear that a cause of action is a form of property protected by 
the Due Process Clause, and the other by landmark rulings such as Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,29 and Mathews v. Eldridge,30 which establish 
that individuals retain considerable control over the disposition of their property 
interests when those interests are threatened by administrative or judicial 
processes. 
Opt-out rights thus guard against the unconstitutional deprivation of 
property without adequate procedures, by allowing each class member to control 
the disposition of his or her constitutionally protected property.  Under these 
strains of due process, the existence of an opt-out right does not turn on whether 
the absent class members lived in the forum state or a neighboring state, but 
simply on whether they had asserted an interest in retaining control over their 
property rights by filing an opt-out form with the court clerk’s office. 
                                                                                                                         
is theoretically possible that a stay-in/opt-out decision might be affected by the convenience of the 
forum, on the assumption that an absentee would be more likely to stay in when capable of 
monitoring the class lawyer’s conduct of the litigation or the implementation of a settlement.  We 
note only that, in the authors’ years of experience in observing nationwide class actions, both 
representing absentees and consulting with other lawyers representing them, we have never 
encountered a situation where the convenience of the class action forum appeared to influence the 
stay-in/opt-out decision.  The distance of the forum does, on occasion, influence the decision 
whether to appear in-person at a settlement fairness hearing, rather than only to object in writing. 
24 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 811-12 (citation omitted). 
27 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1982). 
28 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807 (“[P]etitioner correctly points out that a chose in action is a 
constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs.”) (citing Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)). 
29 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-20, cited in Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. 
30 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-49 (1976). 




Over a decade after Shutts, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,31 the Court 
elaborated on its earlier due process concerns, explicitly extending them beyond 
a personal jurisdiction rationale.  In Ortiz, the Court overturned a nationwide 
federal court settlement of future asbestos personal injury claims, rejecting the 
theory that the defendant company, and its liability insurer, constituted a “limited 
fund” that justified mandatory certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(B).32  The Court explained that opt-out rights stem from “our deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,”33 
specifically noting that “[t]he inherent tension between representative suits and 
the day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damages claims gathered in 
a mandatory class” where “[t]he legal rights of absent class members . . . are 
resolved regardless of either their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their 
express wish to the contrary.”34  These concerns, among others, were the basis 
for the Court’s view that a narrow construction of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was 
necessary to avoid “serious constitutional concerns” that would be presented by 
mandatory certification of traditional money damages claims.35  Ortiz cited Shutts 
with approval, describing the case as one involving “related circumstances,”36 
which would have been an unusual characterization if Shutts were solely about 
the due process limits of personal jurisdiction.  For present purposes, the 
importance of Ortiz is that its reasoning centers on the need to provide the 
affected absent class members, and not other parties to the class action, with 
control over disposition of their property interests, and not on a “minimum 
contacts” analysis. 
B.  Does the Legal Rationale for Opt-Out Rights Matter? 
Does it matter whether the justification for the opt-out right focuses on 
notions of personal jurisdiction or, rather, on individual control over property 
rights protected by the Due Process Clause?  Both the case law and our practice 
experience suggest that it does.  Viewing the opt-out right solely as a matter of 
personal jurisdiction, some courts have held that, when an absentee-objector 
challenges a settlement both on the ground that it does not accord an opt-out right 
and that the settlement is unfair or otherwise unlawful, the objector waives any 
right to opt out on the theory that addressing the merits constitutes consent to the 
jurisdiction of the court.37  That result has bizarre practical consequences: a rule 
prohibiting the court from considering an objector’s twin challenge to the 
                                                                                                                         
 
31 Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
32 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
33 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989)) (internal marks 
omitted). 
34 Id. at 846-47. 
35 Id. at 842, 845, 864. 
36 Id. at 847. 
37 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (8th Cir. 1995); White v. Nat’l 
Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. 
Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1989). 




mandatory nature of a class action settlement and the settlement’s fairness both 
discourages fairness objections and encourages objectors to abandon the class 
action forum and present their opt-out objection in a collateral attack.38 
Of equal significance, settling class action defendants have argued that the 
right to opt out under Shutts does not apply to residents of the forum state who, in 
a traditional “minimum contacts” analysis, would have no due process basis for 
failing to answer a suit filed in that state.39  This argument, if adopted, would 
have serious implications for forum state residents who would never, as a 
constitutional matter, have a right to opt out.40  Limiting the opt-out right in that 
way makes no sense.  In a nationwide class action pending in Philadelphia, for 
instance, it is difficult to argue based on distant forum abuse—or any other 
sensible rationale—that opt-out rights must be accorded to class members across 
the river in Camden, New Jersey, but not to class members over 400 miles away 
in Erie, Pennsylvania.  Although traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine would 
allow suit against an in-state defendant no matter how distant the forum (but not 
                                                                                                                         
 
38 The argument that a class action objector “consents” to jurisdiction by presenting fairness 
objections is wrong even if Shutts is viewed through a personal jurisdiction lens.  The notion that 
one consents to jurisdiction simply by appearing in the class action forum and raising both 
jurisdiction and merits-based arguments is at odds with the modern view taken by the Federal 
Rules, which permit a party to challenge personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) at the outset of 
the case and also to participate fully in all aspects of the merits if the challenge to personal 
jurisdiction is rebuffed, without waiving the personal jurisdiction challenge.  See 5B CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1351, at 313-14 (3d ed. 
2004) (“A party who has unsuccessfully raised an objection [to personal jurisdiction] under Rule 
12(b)(2) may proceed to trial on the merits without waiving the ability to renew the objection to the 
court’s jurisdiction.”).  The idea that, by appearing in the class action forum, the absentee forfeits 
his opt-out right if he argues the merits, see In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Servs. Antitrust 
Litig., 869 F.2d at 769, is implicitly predicated on the need for a “special appearance” to challenge 
jurisdiction, which has been abolished by the Federal Rules, see 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1362, at 100 (3d ed. 2004).  Moreover, 
this argument appears foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz.  There, the objectors 
appeared in the district court and raised a host of arguments on the merits of the settlement, as well 
as the right-to-opt-out argument based on Shutts.  See Brief for Petitioners at 39-42, Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (No. 97-1704), available at LEXIS, 1997 U.S. Briefs 1704.  
The Supreme Court gave no hint that the Shutts argument had been forfeited because arguments on 
the merits had also been raised.  To the contrary, as we have discussed, the Court dealt with Shutts 
at some length, using it as additional authority for its decision rejecting the mandatory settlement 
there.  Oritz, 527 U.S. at 847-48. 
39 Cf. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559-60 (3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that, 
under Shutts, absent class member’s ownership of stock of Delaware corporation might be 
sufficient “minimum contacts” with Delaware forum to eliminate opt-out right). 
40 For class action plaintiffs seeking a state court forum, class actions filed solely by forum state 
plaintiffs against forum state defendants may proliferate in the wake of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 (2005), which generally provides for original and removal federal 
jurisdiction in class actions against non-forum-state defendants.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 
(2005) (with section 1332(d) regarding original jurisdiction and section 1453 regarding removal). 




necessarily over a much closer out-of-state defendant), there is no reason to 
extend that approach to the opt-out context.41 
C.  Denying Opt-Out Based on “Predominance”  
Another tactic used by litigating defendants and by settling parties (both 
plaintiffs and defendants) to obtain approval of mandatory classes has been to 
argue that injunctive (or other “equitable”) relief “predominates” over the class 
members’ damages claims, or that the damages claims flow from conduct that the 
plaintiffs seek to enjoin.  In these so-called “hybrid” damages/injunctive relief 
cases, some courts have accepted these predominance arguments on the theory 
that reasonable plaintiffs would have sought injunctive relief and that an award of 
such relief would be “reasonably necessary and appropriate.”42  Another court of 
appeals, in a novel interpretation of little-used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(A),43 denied absentees opt-out rights from a settlement because the class 
members’ claims for injunctive relief might have conflicted with similar claims 
in pending or even potential litigation, despite the presence of substantial 
damages claims.44 
Other courts, led by the Fifth Circuit in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,45 
have been wary of certifying hybrid mandatory classes, at least, as in Allison, 
where the defendant opposed class certification, rather than supporting it.46  
Thus, Allison would allow non-opt-out certification only where each class 
member’s damages recovery would be easily and mechanically calculable and 
flow directly from the conduct sought to be enjoined—in other words, only 
where each class member’s damages had resulted from conduct that affected 
each class member in a substantially identical manner.47  Although these 
decisions purported to be deciding when injunctive relief “predominated” over 
claims for damages, they expressed concern that any broader test would trample 
class members’ rights to opt out and determine their own litigation destiny.48  In 
                                                                                                                         
 
41 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in this subpart B, the Shutts requirements of notice, right 
to opt-out, and court determination of adequacy of representation would apply in federal court, 
even if Rule 23 did not provide for them and even though state court territorial limits on personal 
jurisdiction would not control in federal court. 
42 See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2001); 
see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2002). 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
44 Smith v. Crystian, 91 F. App’x 952 (5th Cir. 2004). 
45 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
46 Id. at 407. 
47 See id. at 415; see also, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999).  
The Fifth Circuit also based its decision in part on the fact that, for some class claims for damages, 
there was a right to trial by jury that conflicted with the equitable aspects of a mandatory class.  
Allison, 151 F.3d at 422-26. 
48 See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000); Jefferson, 195 
F.3d at 898; see also Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000) 




this regard, these decisions resemble earlier rulings, warning that expansive 
interpretations of the mandatory subdivisions of Rule 23(b) would swallow up 
the notice and opt-out rights that the rule makers intended to provide class 
members having significant individual interests at stake.49  And while these cases 
principally involved interpretations of Rule 23, they recognized that due process 
lurked in the background and that Shutts and Ortiz demanded an interpretation of 
the rule that protects opt-out rights whenever substantial damages claims are at 
stake.50 
We agree with an approach that narrowly defines the circumstances in 
which hybrid classes can be certified on a non-opt-out basis.  However, we also 
believe that the predominance inquiry has little to commend it, either doctrinally 
or as a practical basis for protecting the rights of absentees.  As a doctrinal 
matter, reliance on “predominance” appears to have arisen from the 1966 Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(b)(2), which, after explaining that 
subdivision (b)(2) was intended to cover actions for injunctive or declaratory 
relief, stated that (b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final 
relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages.”51  The note thus 
sought to limit (not expand) the reach of (b)(2) certification.  It did not address 
the question whether hybrid actions could be certified exclusively on a 
mandatory basis, or whether the opt-out subdivision—Rule 23(b)(3)—had to be 
employed in such circumstances, at least as to class members’ claims for 
substantial monetary relief.52 
More fundamentally, Rule 23(b)(2)’s text does not mention 
“predominance.”  It simply describes the kind of class claims amenable to 
certification under that subdivision—claims for final injunctive and declaratory 
relief—and it does not address how hybrid class actions ought to be treated.53  
Put differently, Rule 23(b)(2) does not attempt to patrol the borderline between it 
and Rule 23(b)(3), the rule’s non-mandatory subdivision.  Ironically, it is only 
Rule 23(b)(3) that refers to predominance, and even there, the rule does not use 
the term to describe the relationship between subdivision (b)(3) and the 
mandatory subdivisions of the rule.  Rather, Rule 23(b)(3) limits certification to 
                                                                                                                         
(“Defendants attempting to purchase res judicata may prefer certification under (b)(2) over (b)(3).”) 
(citing Allison, 151 F.3d 402). 
49 See, e.g., In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975) (expansive 
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) would render Rule 23(b)(3) “superfluous”). 
50 See, e.g., Telectronics, 221 F.3d at 881; Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 899 (explaining that Ortiz “says in 
no uncertain terms that class members’ right to notice and an opportunity to opt out should be 
preserved whenever possible”); see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note; see, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. 
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing advisory committee’s note). 
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note. 
53 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (applying where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief 
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole”). 




those situations where common questions of law or fact “predominate” over 
individual questions,54 and then only where two key safeguards—individualized 
notice and the right to opt out—are present.55  In sum, nothing in Rule 23 
provides that one of the rule’s subdivisions trumps another based on 
predominance.56 
There is another adverse consequence of forcing a hybrid class action into 
either Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2): it eliminates the need for individual notice to class 
members and often any notice at all unless there is a settlement, in which case, 
under Rule 23(e), notice is required for all classes.  For plaintiffs, not having to 
provide notice may be attractive because it eliminates potentially large out-of-
pocket expenses, which is often why defendants in a litigation class action urge 
the court to allow certification only under Rule 23(b)(3), if at all.  But lack of any 
kind of notice will generally mean that class members will learn of the case only 
if there is a settlement, instead of at a time when they might be able to 
participate—as they have the explicit right to do in Rule 23(b)(3) cases.  Early 
notice, even if not to everyone in the class, increases the possibility of 
participation by absent class members that might alert class counsel and the court 
to possible differences of opinions among the class as to how to proceed or what 
kind of relief to seek.  It also might bring to light differences among class 
members that would suggest the need for subclasses or changes in the class 
definition.  To be sure, Rule 23(c)(2)(A) could be amended to make some notice 
mandatory for all certified classes, but until it is, forcing hybrid actions out of 
Rule 23(b)(3) denies the class and the court the benefits that flow from early 
notice to at least a representative portion of the class. 
Another aspect of Shutts suggests that the focus on predominance may not 
pass constitutional muster.  The Court there spoke of “claims wholly or 
predominately for money judgments”57 and expressed no view on whether any 
part of its holding applied to other kinds of cases, “such as those seeking 
equitable relief.”58  We emphasize the Court’s use of the word “claims” because 
we think it suggests that the proper approach to the hybrid class action is to focus 
on whether the absentees possess claims that are sufficiently substantial to 
warrant an opt-out right, regardless of whether those claims are appended to 
other claims that would not warrant such a right.  We nonetheless recognize 
Shutts did not deal explicitly with hybrid class actions, let alone with whether 
there is a right to opt out on monetary claims that may be a part of them.59 
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56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
57 Phillips Petroleum  Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985) (emphasis added). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 801-02.  Similarly, Ortiz did not address this question since the case involved only 
monetary claims.  The Court has twice granted review to consider the question whether due process 
permits a class action settlement involving claims for both injunctive and monetary relief to be 
certified on an exclusively mandatory basis, but in both instances the Court dismissed the writ of 




In any event, a claim-by-claim analysis makes sense.  As long as an 
absentee holds a substantial claim for relief that, standing alone, would warrant 
an opt-out right and that the class complaint or settlement release would 
adjudicate or extinguish, it should not matter whether the class asserts claims for 
other relief that, standing alone, might justify mandatory treatment.  After all, a 
class member wishing to sue individually on a claim for substantial money 
damages seeks a remedy for a past wrong, and so may have no interest in, and 
might not benefit from, the class’s claims for injunctive relief, which involve 
only a prospective remedy.  This is especially true where the plaintiffs allege that 
the defendant engaged in fraud or other similar conduct that would make it likely 
that the plaintiffs would take their business elsewhere in the future.  Indeed, even 
prior to Shutts, some courts considering the proper treatment of hybrid claims 
under Rule 23 recognized that the best way to deal with the problem of hybrid 
cases was to approve a hybrid class certification: certifying aspects of the case 
(usually claims for injunctive relief) on a non-opt-out basis and other aspects 
(usually claims for monetary relief) on an opt-out basis.60  Post-Shutts, courts 
have continued to suggest that such an approach may be required by the 
Constitution, if not by Rule 23.61 
Assessing the propriety of mandatory versus opt-out certification on a 
claim-by-claim, rather than a predominance or, “whole case,” basis is particularly 
important in the context of settlement classes.  The vast majority of class actions 
settle.  A large number of class actions that settle are, as we have explained, cases 
that are certified and settled simultaneously,62 as distinguished from class actions 
where the case is certified for litigation, and the opt-out right (if any) is provided 
prior to any resolution on the merits.63  In such cases, the settling parties jointly 
ask the district judge both to certify the class on whatever basis the settling 
parties have agreed upon and to approve the settlement as fair.  As discussed 
earlier, at that juncture, the settling defendant has an enormous incentive to 
propose a mandatory settlement class to achieve a global resolution, particularly 
in cases where individual litigation is a viable option and thus opt-outs are likely.  
And, in such cases, class counsel has little incentive to resist. 
                                                                                                                         
certiorari as improvidently granted without reaching the merits.  See also Adams v. Robertson, 520 
U.S. 83 (1997); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). 
60 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1983); Officers for 
Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1982); Penson v. Terminal Transp. 
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61 See, e.g., Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 951 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ticor, 511 U.S. at 
121 (noting “substantial possibility” that Rule 23 may require opt-out rights in hybrid cases 
whenever substantial damages claims are present, but not addressing the possibility of a partial opt-
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62 In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 786-800 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (extended discussion of settlement classes). 
63 Id.  Class actions certified for litigation often settle, but by that time the decision whether to 
certify on an opt-out or mandatory basis has already been made. 




In our experience, the settlement class action setting is a breeding ground 
for manipulating mandatory certification.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ortiz, for instance, even class actions that sought only monetary relief were 
sometimes cast as “equitable” in nature and thus purportedly subject to 
mandatory certification, on the ground that the defendant could not afford more 
than what it had agreed to pay in settlement, even where the settling defendant or 
its corporate parent was left with significant resources.64  More frequently, both 
before and after Ortiz, we have been confronted with class action settlements 
involving claims that have historically been litigated exclusively, or nearly 
exclusively, as money damages claims, but which, for the purposes of a 
mandatory settlement, have been paired with claims for injunctive relief that are 
said, dubiously in our view, to predominate over the monetary claims.65 
Take, for example, the Tower Loan class action,66 involving allegations that 
a lender violated a variety of common-law and statutory prohibitions by, among 
other things, deceiving borrowers into buying useless insurance in conjunction 
with their loans, failing to disclose various fees, and “churning” the class 
members’ loan refinancing solely to generate fees and interest for the defendants.  
Historically, every settlement and judgment against the Tower Loan defendants 
and others engaged in similar practices, involved substantial money damages, 
which ranged into the tens of thousands of dollars, sometimes included punitive 
damages, and varied considerably from plaintiff to plaintiff.  The class action 
complaint contained eighteen counts seeking money damages, plus a boilerplate 
claim for injunctive relief asking the court to prohibit the defendant from 
engaging in future unlawful conduct.67 
The Tower Loan class action was settled on a non-opt-out basis.  The 
settlement provided small monetary payments of about forty to eighty dollars per 
class member, required the defendant to reform some of its future lending 
practices for five years (but not longer), and released all claims that the class 
members might have against the defendants arising out of their loan practices.68  
Approximately 1,200 class members, most of whom had already sued the 
defendants individually for money damages, opposed the mandatory settlement 
and requested the right to opt out.69  The district court held that the presence of 
                                                                                                                         
 
64 See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 878-80 (6th Cir. 2000); Ortiz, 527 
U.S. at 859-60. 
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66 See generally Tower Loan, 216 F.R.D. 338. 
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http://www.citizen.org/documents/Certpetitionfinal.pdf (unsuccessful petition for a writ of 
certiorari). 
68 Id. at 1. 
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injunctive relief allowed the case to be certified and settled on a mandatory basis 
under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(1)(A), despite the presence of claims for monetary 
relief, and it rejected any due process right to opt out on essentially the same 
grounds.70  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, solely under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), holding 
that where an injunction is sought, and another class member had sought or could 
in the future seek an injunction with respect to the same conduct, mandatory 
certification of all claims is appropriate, ignoring Shutts and Ortiz entirely.71 
In our view, the request for injunctive relief in Tower Loan was not based 
on a genuine need or desire on the part of the class to obtain an injunction; rather, 
it served simply as a vehicle to allow the settling parties to argue that the 
predominance of injunctive relief justified mandatory settlement of the class’s 
substantial monetary claims.  Thus, the plaintiffs in Tower Loan had already 
suffered harm from defendant’s alleged financial misconduct, and hence a 
promise to reform that conduct in future transactions would provide no benefit to 
vast numbers of class members who would not enter into such transactions again.  
The same is true in any hybrid damages/injunctive relief case, where the class 
includes former customers who will not benefit from injunctive relief unless they 
choose to do business with the defendant in the future.  At the very least, at the 
time of settlement, those class members would have no genuine claims for an 
injunction, let alone claims that can be said to predominate over their very real 
claims for money damages.72 
But the courts need not delve into whether a particular request for injunctive 
relief is a sham or whether class members would or would not benefit from such 
relief.  That inquiry only matters if the question whether to certify on a 
mandatory or opt-out basis is seen as a unitary proposition.  If, however, hybrid 
cases are seen as candidates for hybrid certification—as we think they should 
be—with some claims subject to mandatory certification and others subject to 
opt-out certification, the courts would not have to consider these questions.  For 
instance, in Tower Loan, even if the injunctive claim of the plaintiff class to 
reform the defendant’s future loan practices warranted mandatory certification 
because of the threat that another suit could subject the defendant to “inconsistent 
adjudications,”73 that would not provide a reason to prevent the class members 
from opting out with respect to their damages claims alone. 
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III.  WHY THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT MATTERS 
After this extended discussion of the right to opt out, it seems fair to ask 
why we care.  The answer is twofold, one based on class member self-
determination and tradition, and the other based on practical class action reality.  
In Ortiz, the Supreme Court described the first set of concerns as flowing from 
the conflict between representative litigation and “our ‘deep-rooted historic 
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,’” which is “magnified 
if applied to damages claims gathered in a mandatory class.”74  Although that 
ideal may give way when there are special efficiencies and a demonstrable need 
for unitary adjudication, as discussed in Part IV below, the Court held that 
mandatory class treatment was the exception and relied on Shutts for the 
proposition that individuals holding substantial monetary claims could not be 
bound to a class judgment without being given the opportunity to exclude 
themselves from its preclusive effect.75 
To be sure, some commentators have urged abandonment of the “day-in-
court” ideal on the ground that mandatory class actions are the only fair and 
economically efficient means for resolving mass litigation.76  Others argue that, 
given the purposes of representative litigation, it is the class, and not individuals 
within the class, whose interests warrant judicial protection.77  Given the scope of 
this essay, and the depth, diversity, and complexity of the vast literature on this 
topic, this is not the place to confront these arguments in detail.78 
In our view, however, the day-in-court ideal is more than an empty 
platitude untethered to the realities of modern litigation.  We do not defend that 
ideal on the ground that the only real-world alternative to mandatory inclusion in 
a class is an individually-represented opt-out plaintiff trying her case to 
judgment.  Like all claims, most claims held by opt-out plaintiffs settle.  And 
many of these claims, particularly those held by mass personal injury claimants, 
are handled and settled (or, in rare cases, tried) by lawyers representing groups of 
plaintiffs.  What makes these opt-out claimants different from absentees in a 
class is that they have a right to control their lawsuits themselves, including 
deciding when and where to file suit and whether to settle or litigate their 
personal case to conclusion. 
As we noted earlier, Shutts’ due process holding is best understood as 
premised on each class member’s property interest in a cause of action that, if the 
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class member so chooses, must be disposed of by the owner of that interest and 
not someone else claiming to be the owner’s representative.  We acknowledge 
that this “property rights” rationale is based, at bottom, not on logic, but on an 
irreducible judgment about the value of self-determination.  Absent unusual 
circumstances, such as eminent domain proceedings, society does not generally 
question that it is the owner, and not someone else, who decides whether, when, 
or for how much to sell the owner’s property, such as his car or home.  And 
many of us bristle at the trend in the health care arena that it is often not “us”—
the patients—or our personally-designated doctor, but an HMO that makes 
decisions about our medical care.  Why, then, should the guiding principle be any 
different for a litigation interest that may involve a car, a home, medical care, or 
a wrongful death that is potentially far more valuable than all of those interests 
combined?  In sum, one rationale for opt-out rights may be tradition, but it is a 
tradition upon which Shutts and Ortiz properly relied.79 
Apart from tradition, opt-out rights make practical sense because they 
provide an important window on the fairness of some class action settlements.  In 
“negative-value,” small-claims damages class actions, class members rarely opt 
out because litigating individually would be economically irrational.80  However, 
in cases where a substantial number of absent class members determine that it is 
economically rational to litigate on their own—for instance, because individual 
damages are potentially significant or because a statutory fee-shifting provision 
makes the case attractive to a lawyer—that sends a signal to the judge evaluating 
the fairness of a settlement.81 
As discussed earlier, in the Tower Loan litigation, more than 1,200 class 
members, virtually all represented by counsel, sought to opt out.82  Counsel for 
those class members had litigated similar cases in the past, and were well situated 
to advise their clients to opt out.  And because the settlement’s monetary 
recovery did not generally exceed eighty dollars per class member, it was not 
                                                                                                                         
 
79 We recognize that a rationale based on control over one’s property interest might be extended to 
justify only opt-in, not opt-out class actions.  Although that is not our view, that issue, too, is 
beyond the scope of this essay.  Compare Mark K. Moller, Let a Hundred Cases Bloom, LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at 62 (calling for opt-in class actions), with David Arkush & Brian Wolfman, 
Let a Hundred Cases Wither, LEGAL TIMES, May 9, 2005, at 58 (defending opt-out class actions). 
80 See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A ‘negative value’ 
suit is one in which class members’ claims ‘would be uneconomical to litigate individually.’”) 
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)). 
81 This factor comes into play in settlement class actions where certification (and, thus, opt-out) and 
settlement take place simultaneously, or under recently added Rule 23(e)(3), which grants the court 
discretion to provide class members in already-certified Rule 23(b)(3) class actions another 
opportunity to opt out at the time of settlement.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) (eff. Dec. 1, 2003).  In 
cases involving small monetary claims, some courts have relied on the fact that there were very few 
opt-outs and/or objectors as an indication that a settlement was fair.  We disagree.  Given that, in 
many cases, the monetary claims are not viable on an individual basis, and given the difficulties for 
class members in objecting to settlements, see infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text, the 
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82 Smith v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338, 350 (S.D. Miss. 2003). 




surprising that anyone with a lawyer was willing to risk losing those modest 
benefits to seek much larger damages in an individual action.  A similar situation 
was presented in In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia,83 where insurgent 
lawyers, experienced in bringing consumer disclosure and fraud claims similar to 
those that were the subject of the class action settlement, solicited hundreds of 
opt-out clients, because their experience told them that the settlement’s benefits 
were a fraction of what could be recovered individually. 
We recognize that lawyers’ self-interest in procuring opt-outs must be 
evaluated as well, and that the presence of a significant number of opt-outs will 
not always demonstrate a settlement’s unfairness.  In some instances, outside 
lawyers may have incentives to draw off class members for their own litigation, 
even if that litigation may not provide benefits to the opt-outs that are any greater 
than those available in the class action.  However, in general, we have no greater 
concern over whether lawyer self-interest drives the opt-out market than whether 
it drives the market for plaintiffs’ consumer and personal injury claims in 
general.  In Tower Loan, for instance, the opt-out lawyers’ self-interest was 
aligned with their clients’ interests: a contingent fee plaintiff’s lawyer 
presumably would have had better things to do than represent opt-out clients, 
unless those clients stood a chance of obtaining considerably more than the small 
amounts being offered in the class action settlement. 
When a class action proceeds on a non-opt-out basis, the court considering 
a settlement cannot obtain a signal from the class members who would otherwise 
choose to exit, and thus it loses one of the few tools at its disposal for settlement 
evaluation.  The court is already at a considerable disadvantage in evaluating 
class action settlements compared to its position in evaluating arguments in 
ordinary adversarial litigation.  It is well understood that class action settlements 
create incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants to collude because 
plaintiffs’ counsel have interests in common with defendants and opposed to 
their class member-clients.84  As Judge Becker has described it, a class action 
may become “a vehicle for collusive settlements that primarily serve the interests 
of defendants—by granting expansive protection from law suits—and of 
plaintiffs’ counsel—by generating large fees gladly paid by defendants as a quid 
pro quo for finally disposing of many troublesome claims.”85  Furthermore, in 
contrast to ordinary litigation, the absent clients cannot control the conduct of 
their lawyers because they have little knowledge of their activities, and, even 
when the clients have sizeable claims that might support individual litigation 
brought by contingent-fee counsel, they typically have insufficient individual 
stakes in the outcome to motivate them to monitor the class attorneys’ behavior.86 
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Once the lead parties have reached a preliminary settlement agreement, 
their goal is to persuade the court to accept the agreement.  The settling parties 
“can be expected to spotlight the [settlement] proposal’s strengths and slight [or 
even hide] its defects.”87  Or, as Judge Easterbrook has colorfully put it, they 
“may even put one over on the court, in a staged performance.”88  Thus, the court 
loses the benefit of the bilateral competition and “adversarial investigation”89 that 
drives traditional litigation and that would tend to unearth information bearing on 
the settlement’s fairness and legality. 
The ideal remedy for this lack of adversariness is the presence of objecting 
class members who seek to overturn unfair and unlawful class settlements.  
Because objectors are not aligned with the settling parties and seek to unveil a 
settlement’s weaknesses, they tend to provide a judge with important information 
and legal argument that would otherwise be absent.90  However, because 
objectors are “outsiders,” they start at a considerable disadvantage in terms of 
knowledge of the case and access to crucial evidence.  They are almost always 
placed under very tight time constraints by schedules typically set by the settling 
parties, whose goal is to allow as little time for objections, and as little access to 
information, as possible.91  And, often, objectors do not come forward because 
their counsel have no realistic opportunity to be paid.  Although courts have the 
power to award objectors’ counsel a fee if they find the objector has improved 
the settlement,92 that is rare.93  More fundamentally, objectors’ attorneys who are 
successful in defeating a settlement altogether get no fee because there is no fund 
from which a fee can be paid.94  Instead, they retain only the opportunity to 
continue litigating on behalf of their clients—precisely what the opt-out right 
provides in the first place. 
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In sum, although objectors play a critical role in some circumstances, their 
opportunity to unmask unfair or unlawful settlements is limited.  In some cases, 
the existence of substantial opt-outs may provide important additional 
information for a judge being asked to approve a settlement under Rule 23(e).  In 
any event, the opt-out right allows class members to escape a settlement that they 
believe is unfair, at least as to them, if not to the class as a whole. 
IV.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Shutts sets forth the constitutional minima for binding absent class members 
to a class judgment, including the right to opt-out.95  We believe that, properly 
construed, both the Due Process Clause and Rule 23 (and its state law 
equivalents) preclude courts from approving non-opt-out hybrid class actions 
where some class members have substantial claims for monetary relief.  
However, based on our experience, we fear that some courts do not appreciate 
the problems created by mandatory hybrid classes, especially in  settlement class 
actions, and that they are unlikely to change their propensity to certify any class 
action with a claim for injunctive relief under either Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), and 
deny class members the right to opt out on their damages claims.  We thought 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz signaled that mandatory classes were 
strongly disfavored,96 but some lower courts have not read it that way. 
For these reasons, we believe that the best way to remedy the problem is to 
amend Rule 23—and its state-law counterparts—to codify the right to opt out in 
a way that resolves any ambiguities left in Shutts’ aftermath and deals effectively 
with the realities of modern class action practice.  We have re-drafted Rule 23 
(only through Rule 23(c)), and have appended both a red-line and a clean version 
of our proposal.  What follows is our explanation of what we did and why.  We 
envision that the substance of what follows would be found in the comments to 
any rule change. 
A.  Summary of Proposal 
In class actions seeking solely an injunction or the distribution of a finite 
fund, we provide that opt-outs not be permitted, except where a subsequent 
action would not present a realistic risk of conflicting orders.  With respect to 
notice at the certification stage, we recommend two changes: (1) in all class 
actions, notice would be provided to at least a representative sample of the class 
and those class members known to have an interest in these claims, and (2) in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class action, individual notice would be required, but only for those 
class members who have claims for monetary relief that could support separate 
actions.  To effect these changes, we propose that there be only two subdivisions 
to Rule 23(b): one would cover class claims for injunctive relief, plus those 
seeking distribution of a finite fund, and the other would cover class claims for 
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monetary relief.  We also make clear that if a class claim seeks both injunctive 
and monetary relief, the court should certify the claims separately to protect the 
opt-out right  and to provide individual notice, if warranted, on claims for 
monetary relief.97 
B.  Explanation of Proposal 
1.  New Rule 23(b)(1) 
Some of the problems under Rule 23 concerning hybrid class actions arise 
from the substantial overlap and lack of clarity of coverage among the three 
subdivisions.  Thus, present-day Rule 23(b)(1)(A) covers situations similar to the 
types of claims for injunctive relief generally brought under Rule 23(b)(2).98  In 
many, but not all, cases covered by both rules, allowing an opt-out would run the 
risk of inconsistent injunctive orders (a very different problem from inconsistent 
results in claims for monetary relief), such that exclusion generally should not be 
permitted.  Current Rule 23(b)(1)(B) deals with limited funds, whether an actual 
fund or, for example, an obligation under an insurance policy or other similar 
contractual obligation to pay a fixed total, where the value of the claims may be 
more than the funds available.  In the limited fund cases, there is no need for an 
injunction to serve its ordinary coercive function.  Rather, if one were needed at 
all, it would only be to prevent claimants from seeking more money from the 
person with the fixed obligation.  Whether an injunction is needed or not, the 
purpose of adjudicating this type of dispute as a class action would be 
undermined if exclusion were permitted.99 
Our new Rule 23(b)(1) would apply where “the relief sought is a 
declaratory or injunctive order or an order regarding the distribution of a finite 
fund or of money owed under a contractual or similar obligation that existed 
prior to the time that the claims in the action arose.”  This provision would cover 
a subset of purely injunctive-type claims, now conceived as Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions, in which relief for one would have to be relief for all because the 
defendant would be unable to comply with two differing injunctions on the same 
topic.  For instance, in a case against a state prison seeking to alleviate 
overcrowding, an order requiring the state to build a new prison wing of a certain 
number of square feet to accommodate a certain number of new beds at a 
particular location would be at odds with an order saying that no such prison 
                                                                                                                         
 
97 For the convenience of the reader accustomed to Rule 23(b)’s three subdivisions, the appended 
proposed Rule eliminates subdivision (2) but keeps subdivisions (1) and (3).  The text of Rule 
23(b)(3) is close to current Rule 23(b)(3), but the text of new (b)(1) is now different from current 
Rules 23 (b)(1) and 23(b)(2). 
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
99 If the number of claimants is small, interpleader could be used, and, in some cases, bankruptcy or 
state law receiverships might also serve the same function.  But even with a narrowed group of 
cases subject to this part of Rule 23, there will still be some cases for which class action treatment 
may be sought. 




wing need be built or that the wing be of a different size to accommodate a 
different number of beds.  Similarly, in a Title VII suit on behalf of a class of 
present and future female job applicants, an order requiring the defendant 
employer to hire women over men in a ratio of 2 to 1 until a certain workforce 
gender ratio were met, or setting one set of rules for seniority rather than another, 
would be incompatible with other injunctions on those topics. 
This new subdivision (b)(1) would also apply to most claims appropriate for 
certification under current Rule 23(b)(1)(A), which was intended to eliminate the 
risk that a defendant would be required to take action by one court but be 
prohibited from taking the same action by another court.100  Thus, as the 1966 
Rules Advisory Committee explained, “[s]eparate actions by individuals against 
a municipality to declare a bond issue invalid or condition or limit it, to prevent 
or limit the making of a particular appropriation or to compel or invalidate an 
assessment, might create a risk of inconsistent or varying determinations.”101  
Mandatory treatment is necessary in those circumstances because a municipality 
may either issue a bond or not, or it may appropriate money or not; it cannot do 
both.  Our proposal includes cases seeking declaratory as well as injunctive relief 
since, in many cases, especially against governmental entities, a court will issue 
only a declaratory judgment on the theory that the defendant will conform its 
conduct to the law without the issuance of an injunction.  This new subdivision 
would also include actions contemplated by current Rule 23(b)(1)(B),102 
involving multiple claims against a fund, a particular piece of property, or an 
insurance or similar contractual obligation, where the fund, property, or contract 
is finite and the claims may exceed the limit.  The proposal also eliminates the 
practice of creating a fund as part of a suit so as to certify the class on a non-opt-
out basis under Rule 23(b)(1)(B); the fund or obligation must exist before the 
claims in the action arose. 
Under this new Rule 23(b)(1), some notice to the class would be required.  
It would not be individual notice, but rather only notice calculated to be received 
by a fair cross section of the class, including class members and lawyers known 
to have expressed an interest in the issues or who have filed similar cases.  The 
                                                                                                                         
 
100 Under current Rule 23(b)(1)(A), a class may be certified on a mandatory basis if “(1) the 
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of 
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would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class . . . .”  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note. 
102 Current Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows mandatory certification if 
 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of . . . 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.] 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 




purpose of this notice is to enable interested persons to make their views known 
to class counsel and in some cases to seek intervention to protect their interests in 
the case.  Notice will also help assure that the court has the opportunity to hear 
from interested parties who may wish to contest certification or otherwise 
participate in the litigation before settlement, by which time substantial resources 
will have already been expended and changes will be more difficult to make.103  
However, notice would not be required to be comprehensive, at least at the 
certification stage.  At the settlement stage, notice would also go to at least a fair 
cross section of the class and would be provided to all class members if necessary 
to enable them to obtain relief.  On the other hand, if the settlement relief were of 
the kind that need not be provided directly to all class members, such as in the 
case regarding issuance of a municipal bond, settlement notice could be 
accomplished by publication or other means short of individualized notice.104 
In at least some cases under our new Rule 23(b)(1), the requested 
injunctive-type relief could be provided to some class members but not others, 
and for those cases, we have provided that the court may permit class members to 
opt out, if certain conditions described below have been met.  These cases would 
include, for instance, consumer challenges to business practices, where the 
defendant could, in fact, conduct itself in one way toward some of its customers 
and in another way toward others.  It is not impossible for a national credit card 
company, for example, to make one set of disclosures to people living in New 
York and another to people living in Illinois.  Businesses regularly treat various 
groups of customers differently to comply with differing state laws or because 
offering the same product at different prices in various locations, or accompanied 
by differing advertising based on perceived differences in regional or ethnic 
preferences, is considered advantageous.  Similarly, some employment 
disputes—such as one requiring the employer to pay overtime to a certain class 
of employees, albeit on a non-uniform basis—would affect the class members’ 
future pay, benefits, or other conditions of employment.  In these cases, an opt-
out might also be allowed. 
Practicability would be the key factor for the court in deciding whether to 
allow opt-out in Rule 23(b)(1) cases.  As set out in our new Rule 23(c)(5)(A), 
exclusion would not be allowed if there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
                                                                                                                         
 
103 Notice might be expanded beyond this minimum at relatively low cost via e-mail notice and 
other Internet publication.  See, e.g., Brian Walters, “Best Notice Practicable” in the Twenty-First 
Century, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4; Jordan S. Ginsburg, Comment, Class Action Notice: The 
Internet’s Time Has Come, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 739. 
104 Current Rule 23(e) already provides this type of flexibility with respect to settlement notice.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.”).  
We leave unchanged the current practice that, absent agreement of the defendant, plaintiffs (or 
more accurately, their counsel) pay for the costs of notice.  See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156, 179 (1974).  In injunctive class actions, the new sampling notice will result in some 
additional costs to class counsel.  However, our proposal to reduce the instances in which 
individual notice is required in cases seeking monetary relief, see infra Part IV.B.2, will lower the 
costs to class counsel in many, if not most, cases brought under Rule 23(b)(3). 




results of an injunction in a future case brought by an opt-out class member 
would make it impossible for the defendant to comply with both orders, or if 
doing so would create undue burdens for the defendant.  Because we are 
proceeding in uncharted waters, we also provide a catch-all reason to deny 
exclusion: where circumstances “would make it unjust or unreasonable to permit 
exclusion.”  Thus, even where the defendant literally could conduct itself in one 
way toward some class members and in another way toward other class 
members, the court would ask whether it is practical to allow class members to 
opt out to pursue injunctive claims against the defendant.  Here, the court would 
consider whether any class member or group of class members have an economic 
incentive in pursuing such claims on their own and whether differing injunctive 
schemes would impose hardship or severe inefficiencies on the defendant.  
Weighing these concerns, the court would have discretion to allow class 
members to opt out on injunctive claims, even where the plaintiff class seeks 
“final injunctive relief”105 or there is potential for “inconsistent or varying 
adjudications.”106  To be sure, a mandatory class in such circumstances would be 
less expensive for the defendant and the court system, but we see no logical 
imperative that demands unitary treatment of all injunctive claims simply 
because they are forward-looking and opt-out treatment of all claims for 
monetary relief simply because they are retrospective in nature. 
Two other aspects of the exclusion decision under Rule 23(b)(1) are 
significant.  The norm is non-exclusion, and so the class members seeking 
exclusion must demonstrate that the party opposing exclusion (normally the 
defendant) would not likely encounter the problems described in Rule 
23(c)(5)(A).  Moreover, once the class member seeking exclusion sets forth a 
prima facie case for allowing it, the opposing party would have to explain why 
there was a reasonable likelihood that the harms set forth in that rule would 
occur.  Second, the decision on exclusion may, but need not, be made at the time 
of class certification.  In some cases, the court will be in a better position to make 
such a determination near the end of the case because it will have more 
information about both the class action before it and related cases, if any, and 
because the precise terms of the injunction will be known, allowing the 
judgments called for by new Rule 23(c)(5)(A) to be made based on an actual and 
not hypothetical injunction. 
2.  New Rule 23(b)(3) 
Our new rule resembles current Rule 23(b)(3) quite closely, with most of 
the changes made in the parts of Rule 23(c) that govern notice in (b)(3) classes.  
We make one change to Rule 23(b)(3): it would apply only to claims in which 
“the relief sought is individual monetary relief.”  This makes explicit what has 
always been implicit in the rule: that it covers individual monetary relief, whether 
denominated legal or equitable, whether called damages or restitution or 
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something else.  Second, we have added the phrase “on their claim” to make 
clear that the requirements of this subdivision must be met on a claim-by-claim 
basis, and that, where a class has more than one claim against a defendant, those 
claims may not be treated on a unitary basis.107  This claim-by-claim requirement 
is also found in additions to Rule 23(a), in the introduction to Rule 23(b), and in 
the amendments to Rule 23(c)(1)(A) regarding the timing of motions for class 
certification.  Of greater significance is new Rule 23(c)(6), which repudiates the 
former practice under which courts often certified hybrid classes as mandatory 
classes.  The new rule directs courts that are presented with hybrid injunctive and 
monetary relief cases to certify the two sets of claims separately (if at all), where 
necessary to protect other notice and opt-out rights under the rule. 
Our new Rule 23(b)(3) would presume that individual notice should be 
given in class actions seeking monetary relief.  Thus, in many cases, it would 
operate like current Rule 23(b)(3).  However, at the certification stage, it would 
expressly permit “fair-cross-section” notice, as under new Rule 23(b)(1), if the 
court determines that “there is no reasonable likelihood that some or all of the 
class members would pursue their own separate actions.”  Thus, this subdivision 
would alter current law by overruling in part Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,108 
which interpreted current Rule 23(b)(3) to require individualized notice to all 
class members possessing even the smallest of damages claims.  Even if the court 
makes such a determination, it must still provide individual notice to “all persons 
who hold claims that might support individual actions.”  Whether there are such 
persons will depend on such factors as the amount of the claim, the complexity of 
the case, and whether there are statutory attorney’s fees or liquidated damages 
provisions that might make the case viable on an individual basis.  The best 
evidence of whether there are class members who might bring separate actions is 
that such actions already are pending or have been brought in the past.  As under 
current law regarding class certification, the factual or legal merits of such claims 
are irrelevant to this inquiry.  In some cases, the defendant will be the only 
person with information about the size of the claims held by various class 
members, and in such cases, discovery should be permitted to determine to whom 
individual notice should be sent. 
An additional word is appropriate regarding statutory fee-shifting 
provisions as they relate to notice under new Rule 23(b)(3).  Legislatures have 
enacted these provisions to enable plaintiffs to act as “private attorneys general” 
to enforce civil rights, consumer, and other rights.  Congress alone has enacted 
dozens of such provisions.109  Our initial inclination was simply to credit the 
legislature’s judgment that the presence of a fee-shifting provision would be 
sufficient to encourage individual litigation and, therefore, to require that all class 
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members with claims involving a fee-shifting provision be entitled to individual 
notice.  That is still our view of what will happen in most cases.  Our personal 
experience and discussions with plaintiffs’ lawyers indicate that the presence of 
fee-shifting provisions do, in fact, often make individual, small-claim litigation 
viable.  There is a vibrant plaintiffs’ bar bringing individual claims under the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act,110 the Truth in Lending Act,111 and a range of 
other federal consumer protection statutes with fee-shifting provisions.  Some of 
these statutes have minimum damages provisions that also enhance the prospects 
for individual enforcement.112   Moreover, some statutes have aggregate limits on 
class action damages,113 which, because they effectively limit personal recoveries 
in class actions, tend to make individual litigation more enticing. 
We recognize, however, that in some types of cases—for instance, small-
claims securities and consumer antitrust litigation—non-class litigation rarely, if 
ever, occurs, despite the presence of a fee-shifting provision114 and in some cases  
the prospect of treble damages.  Perhaps defendants’ considerable resources and 
the enormity of discovery make such cases viable only on a class basis.  
Whatever the reason, because of this reality, the strong presumption that 
individual notice be afforded to all class members can be overcome where class 
counsel can show that the relevant fee-shifting provision has not created a market 
for individual small-claims litigation. 
Thus, in certain small-claims cases under new Rule 23(b)(3), sampling 
notice would be sufficient.  In addition, any class member who expressed an 
interest in the case, who had filed his or her own action, or who had a claim that 
might support a separate action, would receive individual notice.  This type of 
hybrid notice would, in our view, satisfy the notice requirements described in 
Shutts, without the massive individualized notice required in every damages case 
under the current rule.  We recognize a certain irony here: under the new rule, the 
class members in Shutts itself might not have  been entitled to individual notice 
because the average value of their claims was $100.115  But neither Shutts nor any 
of the Court’s other due process rulings suggest that the Constitution requires 
more than representative notice, a right to opt-out, and a court determination that 
the class representative and class counsel adequately represent the class, where 
the claims would ordinarily fall with the jurisdiction of a small claims court. 
To the contrary, the due process balancing approach approved by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge116 suggests that the Court would uphold 
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the kind of notice provided for by this new rule.  The practice of requiring class 
counsel to provide and pay for notice to persons with claims of $5, $50, or even 
$500 in complex securities and antitrust class actions is both wasteful and unduly 
advantageous to defendants.  However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in  
Eisen, current Rule 23 mandates not only that mailed notice to all class members 
is required in all damages class actions, but that the plaintiff, not the defendant, 
bear the cost of that notice.117  Thus, the only way to get the defendant to pay for 
notice is to settle, making the current Rule 23(b)(3) a breeding-ground for sell-
out settlements.  Under our new Rule 23, with its much less expensive “fair 
cross-section” notice in certain small-claims cases, plaintiffs’ counsel would feel 
much freer to litigate the case vigorously at the certification stage (and then 
beyond), knowing that they would be under no obligation to foot the bill for a 
massive notice that does not advance the interests of their clients.  Class counsel 
will still have to pay for notice at the certification stage, but the costs of sampling 
notice will be much more reasonable. 
The right to opt-out under new Rule 23(b)(3) would continue to be absolute, 
even though in some cases class members would not have been provided 
individual notice.  We considered whether opt-rights should be denied to class 
members with very small claims, on theory that they will never use them to bring 
their own separate actions.  We concluded, however, that there is no need for a 
rule forbidding small-claims opt-outs: if a claim is not worth bringing separately, 
it will not be brought, and hence no court order precluding an opt-out is needed.  
On the other hand, if a class member determines that the claim is worth bringing 
or wishes to opt out for any other reason, there is no reason for Rule 23 not to 
honor that decision. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Properly understood, Shutts and Ortiz support a broad right to opt out to 
pursue claims that rationally can be litigated on a non-class basis.  That right can 
best be protected, and Shutts’ ambiguities best resolved, through a restructuring 
of Rule 23(b)’s subdivisions that eliminates artificial divisions between claims 
seeking monetary and injunctive relief; forces the courts to focus on the specific 
claims brought on behalf of the class; allows opt-out rights with respect to at least 
some claims for injunctive relief; and eliminates the wasteful requirement of 
notice to all Rule 23(b)(3) class members whose claims are almost certain not to 
be brought on an individual basis.  This proposal comports both with Shutts and 
the needs of class action practice today. 
                                                                                                                         
 
117 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974). 





I.  Proposed Amendments to Rule 23 (Redline Version) 
Rule 23.  Class Actions 
 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.  One or more members of a class may sue 
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all the class with respect to a 
claim or defense only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) 
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class on such claims or defenses. 
 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may be maintained as a class action 
with respect to a claim or defense if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are 
satisfied, and in addition: 
 
(1) the relief sought is a declaratory or injunctive order or an order 
regarding the distribution of a finite fund or contractual or similar obligation that 
existed prior to the time that the claims in the action arose; 
 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of 
the class would create a risk of 
 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class, or 
 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members 
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to 
protect their interests; or 
 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
 
(3) the relief sought is individual monetary relief, and the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class on their claim 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 




litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members 
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action. 
 
(c) Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action; Appointing 
Class Counsel; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple 
Classes and Subclasses. 
 
(1)(A) When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class with 
respect to a claim or defense, the court must—at an early practicable time—
determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action with respect to 
such claim or defense. 
 
(B) An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class 
claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g). 
 
(C) An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before final 
judgment. 
 
(2)(A) For any class certified under this Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may 
shall direct appropriate notice to the class.  (B) For any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.  The notice must shall concisely and clearly 
state in plain, easily understood language: 
• the nature of the action, 
• the definition of the class certified, 
• the class claims, issues, or defenses, 
• that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the 
member so desires, 
• if the court determines that permitting exclusion is required by, or is 
otherwise appropriate under, Rule 23(c)(5), that the court will exclude from the 
class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may 
elect to be excluded, and 
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 
23(c)(3). 
 
(B)(i) For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1), appropriate notice shall 
include individual notice to a representative sample of the class and to all persons 
that the court determines have manifest an interest in the action, including all 
persons who may be class members and who have filed other similar actions, and 
any other person who has requested to be informed about the action. 
 
(ii) For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), appropriate notice shall 
include individual notice to all members of the class who can be identified 
through reasonable effort, unless the court determines that, because there is no 




reasonable likelihood that some or all of the class would pursue their own 
separate actions, individual notice is not necessary or justified, in which case 
notice shall be provided pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i), and individual 
notice shall be provided to all persons who hold claims that might support 
individual actions. 
 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under 
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include 
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.  The 
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), 
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those 
to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have 
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class. 
 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into 
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule 
shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
 
(5)(A) For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1), there shall be no right of 
exclusion, unless the court determines that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
relief that might be granted in a subsequent action by class members seeking 
exclusion from this action (i) would make it impossible for a party to comply 
with a judgment or order in both actions; (ii) would impose undue burdens on a 
party having to comply with a judgment or order in both actions or (iii) would 
create circumstances that would make it unjust or unreasonable to permit 
exclusion.  The court may, but need not, determine whether to permit exclusion 
at the time of certification, or it may make such determination at such other time 
before final judgment as it deems appropriate. 
 
(B) The court shall permit exclusion from any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(3). 
 
(6) The court shall analyze separately each of the claims for relief asserted 
by the class in deciding whether, and under what subdivision of Rule 23(b), to 
certify the action as a class action, and may, as required by this Rule, certify one 
or more claims under Rule 23(b)(1) and one or more claims under Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
[NO CHANGES AFTER THIS POINT.] 
 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions.  In the conduct of actions to which this rule 
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of 
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication 
in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of 
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that 
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the 
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or 




of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or 
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative 
parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate 
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action 
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.  The orders 
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as 
may be desirable from time to time. 
 
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. 
 
(1)(A) The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class. 
 
(B) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise. 
 
(C) The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding 
that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. 
 
(2) The parties seeking approval of a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise under Rule 23(e)(1) must file a statement identifying any agreement 
made in connection with the proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise. 
 
(3) In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity 
to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity 
to request exclusion but did not do so. 
 
(4)(A) Any class member may object to a proposed settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise that requires court approval under Rule 23(e)(1)(A). 
 
(B) An objection made under Rule 23(e)(4)(A) may be withdrawn only with 
the court’s approval. 
 
(f) Appeals.  A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an 
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this 
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.  An 
appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or 
the court of appeals so orders. 
 
(g) Class Counsel. 
 




(1) Appointing Class Counsel. 
 
(A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must 
appoint class counsel. 
 
(B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class. 
 
(C) In appointing class counsel, the court 
 
(i) must consider: 
• the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims 
in the action, 
• counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, 
and claims of the type asserted in the action, 
• counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law, and 
• the resources counsel will commit to representing the class; 
 
(ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class; 
 
(iii) may direct potential class counsel to provide information on any 
subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and 
nontaxable costs; and 
 
(iv) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
 
(2) Appointment Procedure. 
 
(A) The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative 
class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action. 
 
(B) When there is one applicant for appointment as class counsel, the court 
may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 
23(g)(1)(B) and (C).  If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment as 
class counsel, the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the 
interests of the class. 
 
(C) The order appointing class counsel may include provisions about the 
award of attorney fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h). 
 
(h) Attorney Fees Award.  In an action certified as a class action, the court may 
award reasonable attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by 
agreement of the parties as follows: 
 
(1) Motion for Award of Attorney Fees.  A claim for an award of attorney 
fees and nontaxable costs must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject 




to the provisions of this subdivision, at a time set by the court.  Notice of the 
motion must be served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed 
to class members in a reasonable manner. 
 
(2) Objections to Motion.  A class member, or a party from whom 
payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
 
(3) Hearing and Findings.  The court may hold a hearing and must find the 
facts and state its conclusions of law on the motion under Rule 52(a). 
 
(4) Reference to Special Master or Magistrate Judge.  The court may 
refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or to a 
magistrate judge as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D). 
II.  Proposed Amendments to Rule 23 (Clean Version) 
Rule 23. Class Actions 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.  One or more members of a class may sue 
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of the class with respect to a claim 
or defense only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class on such claims or defenses. 
 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may be maintained as a class action 
with respect to a claim or defense if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are 
satisfied, and in addition: 
 
(1) the relief sought is a declaratory or injunctive order or an order 
regarding the distribution of a finite fund or contractual or similar obligation that 
existed prior to the time that the claims in the action arose; 
 
(2) [THERE IS NO SUBSECTION (2)] 
 
(3) the relief sought is individual monetary relief, and the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class on their claim 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.  The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members 
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 




the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action. 
 
(c) Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action; Appointing 
Class Counsel; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple 
Classes and Subclasses. 
 
(1)(A) When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class with 
respect to a claim or defense, the court must—at an early practicable time—
determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action with respect to 
such claim or defense. 
 
(B) An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class 
claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g). 
 
(C) An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before final 
judgment. 
 
(2)(A) For any class certified under this Rule, the court shall direct 
appropriate notice to the class.  The notice shall concisely and clearly state in 
plain, easily understood language: 
• the nature of the action, 
• the definition of the class certified, 
• the class claims, issues, or defenses, 
• that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the 
member so desires, 
• if the court determines that permitting exclusion is required by, or is 
otherwise appropriate under, Rule 23(c)(5), that the court will exclude from the 
class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may 
elect to be excluded, and 
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 
23(c)(3). 
 
(B)(i) For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1), appropriate notice shall 
include individual notice to a representative sample of the class and to all persons 
that the court determines have manifest an interest in the action, including all 
persons who may be class members and who have filed other similar actions, and 
any other person who has requested to be informed about the action. 
 
(ii) For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), appropriate notice shall 
include individual notice to all members of the class who can be identified 
through reasonable effort, unless the court determines that, because there is no 
reasonable likelihood that some or all of the class would pursue their own 
separate actions, individual notice is not necessary or justified, in which case 
notice shall be provided pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i), and individual 
notice shall be provided to all persons who hold claims that might support 
individual actions. 





(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action, whether or not 
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the 
notice was directed and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court 
finds to be members of the class. 
 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into 
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule 
shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
 
(5)(A) For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1), there shall be no right of 
exclusion, unless the court determines that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
relief that might be granted in a subsequent action by class members seeking 
exclusion from this action (i) would make it impossible for a party to comply 
with a judgment or order in both actions; (ii) would impose undue burdens on a 
party having to comply with a judgment or order in both actions or (iii) would 
create circumstances that would make it unjust or unreasonable to permit 
exclusion.  The court may, but need not, determine whether to permit exclusion 
at the time of certification, or it may make such determination at such other time 
before final judgment as it deems appropriate. 
 
(B) The court shall permit exclusion from any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(3). 
 
(6) The court shall analyze separately each of the claims for relief asserted 
by the class in deciding whether, and under what subdivision of Rule 23(b), to 
certify the action as a class action, and may, as required by this Rule, certify one 
or more claims under Rule 23(b)(1) and one or more claims under Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
[NO CHANGES AFTER THIS POINT.] 
 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions.  In the conduct of actions to which this rule 
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of 
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication 
in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of 
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that 
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the 
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or 
of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or 
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative 
parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate 
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action 
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.  The orders 
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as 
may be desirable from time to time. 





(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. 
 
(1)(A) The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class. 
 
(B) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise. 
 
(C) The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding 
that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. 
 
(2) The parties seeking approval of a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise under Rule 23(e)(1) must file a statement identifying any agreement 
made in connection with the proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise. 
 
(3) In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity 
to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity 
to request exclusion but did not do so. 
 
(4)(A) Any class member may object to a proposed settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise that requires court approval under Rule 23(e)(1)(A). 
 
(B) An objection made under Rule 23(e)(4)(A) may be withdrawn only with 
the court’s approval. 
 
(f) Appeals.  A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an 
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this 
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.  An 
appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or 
the court of appeals so orders. 
 
(g) Class Counsel. 
 
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. 
 
(A) Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must 
appoint class counsel. 
 
(B) An attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class. 
 




(C) In appointing class counsel, the court 
 
(i) must consider: 
• the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims 
in the action, 
• counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, 
and claims of the type asserted in the action, 
• counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law, and 
• the resources counsel will commit to representing the class; 
 
(ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class; 
 
(iii) may direct potential class counsel to provide information on any 
subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and 
nontaxable costs; and 
 
(iv) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
 
(2) Appointment Procedure. 
 
(A) The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of the putative 
class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action. 
 
(B) When there is one applicant for appointment as class counsel, the court 
may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 
23(g)(1)(B) and (C). If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment as 
class counsel, the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the 
interests of the class. 
 
(C) The order appointing class counsel may include provisions about the 
award of attorney fees or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h). 
 
(h) Attorney Fees Award.  In an action certified as a class action, the court may 
award reasonable attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by 
agreement of the parties as follows: 
 
(1) Motion for Award of Attorney Fees.  A claim for an award of attorney 
fees and nontaxable costs must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject 
to the provisions of this subdivision, at a time set by the court.  Notice of the 
motion must be served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed 
to class members in a reasonable manner. 
 
(2) Objections to Motion.  A class member, or a party from whom 
payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
 




(3) Hearing and Findings.  The court may hold a hearing and must find the 
facts and state its conclusions of law on the motion under Rule 52(a). 
 
(4) Reference to Special Master or Magistrate Judge.  The court may 
refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or to a 
magistrate judge as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D). 
